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Over the last few years, there has been a devolutionary tendency in many developed and developing 
countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose whether the benefits in terms of 
efficiency derived from transfers of powers from higher to municipal levels of government (the 
“economic dividend” of devolution) might increase over time. This methodology is based on linear 
programming approaches for efficiency measurement. We provide an application to Spanish 
municipalities, which have had to adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to 
domestic regulation seeking local governments’ balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency 
gains from enhanced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which 
these gains accrue differs across municipalities—in some cases technical change is the main 
component, whereas in others catching up dominates. 
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Durante los últimos años ha habido una corriente hacia la descentralización de poderes desde la 
administración central hacia capas más bajas de gobierno, tanto en países desarrollados como en 
vías de desarrollo. En este artículo proponemos una metodología para determinar si los beneficios 
en términos de eficiencia derivados de la transferencia de poderes a los municipios (el “dividendo 
económico” de la descentralización) podrían aumentar en el tiempo. La técnica está basada en 
enfoques de programación lineal para la medición de la eficiencia. Llevamos a cabo la aplicación a 
los municipios españoles, que han tenido que adaptarse tanto al Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento 
europeo, así como a la Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria. Los resultados indican que las 
ganancias de eficiencia derivadas de una mayor descentralización han aumentado en los últimos 
años. Sin embargo, el modo en que estas se originan varía según municipios –en algunos casos es el 
cambio técnico el factor dominante, en otros han sido las ganancias de eficiencia-. 
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 31. Introduction
The literature on the economic dividend of devolution, i.e., the transfer of powers from higher
to lower layers of government, has been growing over the last few years. Many factors have
prompted its blooming, among which we may highlight three. First, in the case of developed
countries, the guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism have prompted its analysis as
a central policy issue both in the United States and several European Union countries (Inman
and Rubinfeld, 1997, 1998). Second, in the developing world it is at the center of reform
eﬀorts not only throughout Latin America and many parts of Asia and Africa but also in
several formerly planned economies (Stewart, 2000). Last, but not least, analyzing the links
between decentralization and eﬃciency has been always at the core of public economics, and
it provides the rationale as to which beneﬁts could arise from decentralizing in developing
countries. As recognized by many studies since Tiebout’s classic essay (1956), a literature
has developed that emphasizes the beneﬁts of political decentralization and the competition
among regional or local governments that it makes possible (Cai and Treisman, 2004).
The literature analyzing the economic dividend of devolution in local government enumer-
ates several advantages, although some downsides also exist. The early contributions date
back to the pioneering studies by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), but given the acceleration
of the global trend towards devolution that has taken place over the last thirty years some
recent studies have reassessed its costs and beneﬁts.1 On the positive hand, we may highlight
that the devolved administrations’ ability to tailor policies to local needs, generate innovation
in service provision through inter-territorial competition, and stimulate participation and ac-
countability by reducing the distance between those in government and their constituencies
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). From the economic costs’ point of view, devolved govern-
mental systems may carry negative economic implications in terms of eﬃciency and equity,
along with the imposition of signiﬁcant institutional burdens.
One of the most important economic beneﬁts that devolution may bring about refers
to municipalities’ productive eﬃciency. As indicated by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004),
some of the proponents of decentralization attribute their support for a greater transfer of
powers towards subnational tiers of government to their negative perception of the capacity
of central governments to deliver public services eﬃciently (Klugman, 1994). This positive
eﬀect may work through a variety of mechanisms. One of them relates to citizen mobility,
1See, for instance, the studies by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), Keating (1998), Klugman (1994), Xie
et al. (1999), or Zhang and Zou (1998), among others.
3which eventually ensures a perfect match between taxpayers’ demands and municipalities’
supply, guaranteeing an eﬃcient delivery of public services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972).
Interterritorial competition at the local and regional level may also play a signiﬁcant role, since
it forces governments to concentrate on the eﬃcient provision of public goods and services
(Tiebout, 1956; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Another mechanism operates through the
advantages that smaller jurisdictions have to tailor their policies to the speciﬁc preferences of
their populations. Indeed, as one may derive from Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, the
larger the variance in taste, the larger are the potential beneﬁts of decentralization. There
are also some arguments which operate from a political perspective. For instance, greater
proximity from local governments to their constituencies allows them greater ﬂexibility to
respond to local needs and preferences, therefore being able to eﬃciently match the provision
of public services to local demand. This proximity to the “people” also widens the scope
for greater political and accountability transparency. In addition, not only does it reduce
bureaucratic complexity and increases citizens’ monitoring capacity, but it stimulates further
eﬃciency gains as elected representatives are obliged to be more sensitive to the preferences
of their constituencies.
However, there are limits to the economic beneﬁts of devolution. Some authors even
point towards the “dangers” of transfers of powers to lower tiers of government (Prud’homme,
1995). The main argument is that national provision of public goods and services may be
more eﬃcient than their provision at the regional and local level. This would occur under
certain circumstances such as when economies of scale and scope exist, and/or there are diﬃ-
culties in assigning powers in a non-overlapping way. A further example is where corruption
at the regional and local level may emerge more easily, and/or regional governments operate
in conditions of “soft budget constraints”. It should also be pointed out that the devolution
of powers to subnational governments might increase spatial disparities, since central gov-
ernment’s powers to curb inequalities are reduced (Prud’homme, 1995). This point has also
been forcefully made by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005), who argue that Peterson’s (1981)
balance between a redistributive central or federal state and distributive and regulatory local
and regional governments can be perturbed by devolution. However, the magnitude of this
limit is partly subjective, because it hinges on the value each nation attaches to reducing
inequalities among its citizens.2
Most of the literature, regardless of the particular vision on whether the links between
2Most of these arguments are expanded in greater detail in Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004).
4eﬃciency and devolution are positive or negative, stresses that more empirical work is needed
(Prud’homme, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Until relatively recent dates, the
existing studies which analyzed the question from this empirical perspective were “surprisingly
few” (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). This claim was recently stressed by Rodríguez-Pose
et al. (2009) who, following Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), indicate that “although the
notion that decentralisation increases widely accepted amongst governments and international
organisations alike, the empirical proof for this proposition remains scant” (Rodríguez-Pose
et al., 2009, p.2041).
Most of the existing empirical studies are country-speciﬁc, although severals cross-country
comparisons have also been published (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Xie
et al., 1999). Some of the early empirical studies report positive links between devolution
and eﬃciency (Akai and Sakata, 2002; Zhang and Zou, 2001). In other cases, relationships
have been found to be weak (Rodríguez-Pose, 1996). The number of empirical studies on the
issue has increased sharply in recent times (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007, see, for instance),
although most of the papers have a tighter focus on the implications of devolution for growth;
see, for instance, Lin and Liu (2000), Thießen (2003), Iimi (2005), Thornton (2007) or, more
recently, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009). Rodríguez-Pose et al.’s (2009) is particularly interesting
in some regards, since it provides a cross-country comparison for ﬁve developed and developing
countries (Germany, India, Mexico, Spain, and the USA) where decentralization initiatives
have diﬀered greatly. Calamai (2009) also discusses issues related to decentralization and
growth (in particular, they study the link between devolution and regional disparities in Italy),
whereas other recent papers such as Silva-Ochoa (2009) deal with related topics (institutions
and the provision of local services) in the case of Mexico. Therefore, the literature is rapidly
bridging the gap on the lack of empirical studies scrutinizing the links between decentralization
and eﬃciency from several perspectives.
In this paper we provide some methods to analyze the beneﬁts from enhanced devolution
in terms of local governments’ eﬃciency from a dynamic perspective. For this, we present
a methodology whose underpinnings are derived from the literature on the analysis of eﬃ-
ciency and productivity using linear programming methods. Speciﬁcally, our methods are
directly derived from the (deterministic) frontier production function literature, based on the
pioneering work of Farrell (1957), and Afriat (1972) and nicely exposited in Färe et al. (1994),
combining them with the recent contribution to evaluate jointly eﬃciency and devolution by
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009). We propose an indicator to measure whether municipalities can
5beneﬁt over time from a hypothetical transfer of powers from higher levels of government,
in such a way that the small municipalities (under 1,000 inhabitants) would provide simi-
lar services as the largest ones. Our goal is to analyze whether these hypothetical eﬃciency
gains—the economic dividend of devolution—increased from year 1995 to 2000, and from 2000
to 2005, and to decompose the gains over time in two components in a similar fashion to the
Malmquist productivity index (Caves et al., 1982).
We analyze this question in the context of Spanish local government. Several reasons sup-
port this application. First, since the passing of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, there has
been a relentless process of devolving powers from national to regional layers of government.
As indicated by Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009), regional pressures, especially those by nation-
alist forces in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, are largely
responsible for this recent devolution of powers to lower layers of government (Núñez, 2001).
In this scenario, the devolutionary process was perceived as a transcendent step for both con-
solidating democracy and creating a more widely accepted form of governance Rodríguez-Pose
(1996). Indeed, as indicated by (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009), devolution is also especially
important in Spain from a point of view of increasing stability and public trust in government
after the death of General Franco, contributing to the strengthening of democratic princi-
ples (Núñez, 2001). The magnitude of this devolutionary process has led to a remarkable
increase in subnational expenditures (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, the increase
of transfers to subnational governments reﬂects their enhanced control over functions and
resources. However, the “hypothetical” second devolution, from regional to local levels of
government, never actually took place, at least compared to the magnitude of the devolution
to the regional level. Therefore, one might naturally wonder why it did not occur and, if it
did, what its economic dividend would be. Second, Spanish municipalities have faced tighter
budget constraints since the passing of the law on budget stability in 2001 (“Ley General de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria”), which establishes mechanisms to control public debt and pub-
lic spending seeking the objective of a balanced budget. This law shares the spirit of the
European Stability and Growth Pact and therefore some of our arguments could be valid—
under certain circumstances—for other euro area countries, where budgetary constraints also
tightened up signiﬁcantly to meet the criteria to join the euro. One might naturally inquire
how these changes might have aﬀected diﬀerent aspects of Spanish municipalities, especially
in terms of eﬃciency and its temporal evolution. Finally, the data on Spanish municipalities
is quite rich. It is therefore interesting per se to exploit the database to analyze a variety of
6local governments’ issues, given that its richness is generally absent in other studies on local
government.
In addition, compared to other European countries, analyzing devolution in the Spanish
case is also important because of the impact of the recent economic and ﬁnancial crises on
Spanish public sector deﬁcit—which as of September, 2009, is roughly 6% of the GDP, whereas
by 2007 there was a surplus. Compared to other European countries the scenario is gloomier
because the forecasts indicate it will take longer for the Spanish economy to surge again. In
this diﬃcult scenario, the relevance of the study eﬃciency and related issues in the public
sector gains momentum.
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, Sections 2 provides the meth-
ods being used. Section 3 presents the data on inputs and outputs, while Section 4 shows the
results. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Methods
Our methods are based on the seminal ideas of Charnes et al. (1978), who developed Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the technical eﬃciency of production. One of the
main advantages of these methods is their absence of rigid assumptions. However, an even
more ﬂexible approach is Free Disposable Hull (FDH) in which the convexity assumption on
the technology is dropped (Deprins et al., 1984). Our study uses this approach for both its
higher ﬂexibility and superior asymptotic properties (Park et al., 2000).
Although most contributions dealing with eﬃciency measurement issues in the public
sector have used either DEA or FDH, some of them have also considered parametric techniques
such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Examples of parametric applications include Deller
(1990, 1992), Deller and Rudnicki (1992), or Hayes and Chang (1990), among others. However,
the number of studies applying nonparametric techniques is much higher including, Grosskopf
and Hayes (1993), De Borger and Kerstens (1996b), De Borger et al. (1994), Hughes and
Edwards (2000), Prieto and Zofío (2001), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007, 2009), Giménez and
Prior (2007), among many others. The choice of method, though, is not always easy. As
suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997) when inquiring whether a “best” frontier method
exists, “the lack of agreement among researchers regarding a preferred frontier model at present
boils down to a diﬀerence of opinion regarding the lesser of evils”. Namely, the parametric
approaches impose a particular functional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier,
whereas nonparametric methods impose less structure on the frontier but do not allow for
7random error.
We choose the nonparametric FDH method for a variety of reasons. As commented on
above, this would include its much higher ﬂexibility and its superior asymptotic properties,
not only compared to parametric methods but also compared to other popular nonparametric
methods such as DEA—under FDH the convexity assumption is dropped. Although the
minuses of FDH relate to its inability for disentangling random error, some rapid progress
has been done in this ﬁeld in recent times. This would include not only the bootstrap, which
allows ascertaining whether diﬀerences across observations are statistically signiﬁcant or not
(Simar and Wilson, 1998), but also the emergence of other methods which are much more
consistent with both FDH and DEA than with any other parametric method (Cazals et al.,
2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005; Daouia et al., 2008; Daouia and Simar, 2007; Martins-Filho
and Yao, 2008), and hence yielding comparable results.3
We can also use some graphical examples to better realize the advantages of using FDH
as opposed to DEA—i.e., the advantages of dropping the convexity assumption. Figure 1
depicts a scenario for ﬁve municipalities (A, B, C, D and E). For simplicity reasons, we
assume that only one output y is produced (which is represented in the horizontal axis) while
the vertical axis represents total costs (TC). In this example, irrespective of the convexity
assumption, units A, B, C and D appear as eﬃcient in their respective scale (say, they are
eﬃcient in the variable returns to scale, VRS, technology), while municipality E is ineﬃcient,
since it is possible to ﬁnd a less costly way to produce the output level production yE. The
standard (convex) VRS cost eﬃciency model will show that it is possible to produce yE with
a lower total cost than the observed cost for municipality E (αDEA ×TCE < TCE). The cost
eﬃciency coeﬃcient αDEA will show a value lower than the unity, indicating the percentage
of the observed cost to reach the convex frontier.
In Figure 1 it is assumed than municipalities A and B are operating in a centralized
environment (which we label S1), while municipalities C, D and E are operating in a de-
centralized environment (which we label S2). In these speciﬁc circumstances, the convexity
assumption causes a problem because the point of the convex cost frontier to evaluate unit
E requires a combination of units B and C which could be unfeasible because they are op-
3There are also some studies (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990) which compare the results yielded by diﬀerent
techniques. In the context of local government this would include De Borger and Kerstens (1996a). Although
in some cases results are similar, in others they change substantially, but this is usually because of the
assumptions of each technique (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). Given the recent advances in the nonparametric
ﬁeld, the comparisons would include, ideally, the diﬀerent techniques in this ﬁeld, comparing DEA and FDH
with more recent proposals such as the order-m (Cazals et al., 2002) or order-α (Daouia et al., 2008) estimators.
We consider this is a promising area of research in which contributions are yet to appear.
8erating in diﬀerent operating frameworks. Under these circumstances, the application of the
non-convex (FDH) cost frontier oﬀers a less controversial combination: unit E is ineﬃcient
because its total costs to produce yE are higher than αFDH × TCE, a cost reference taken
from the existence of unit C. In this simple example, it is worth mentioning than part of the
cost excess [(αFDH − αDEA) × TCE] hinges exclusively on the convexity assumption.
In a previous study Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) present a methodology to compare central-
ized (municipalities with less powers) and decentralized municipalities (with more powers).
The main interest of their proposal was to enable comparison—in a non-convex framework—
of decentralized municipalities with two reference points on the frontier, namely, one from the
decentralized sub-sample (S2) of municipalities and the other from the centralized sub-sample
(S1).4 Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical scenario where decentralized municipalities appear to
be more eﬃcient than centralized when evaluating unit E. As it can be shown, the total cost
of cloning three times the centralized municipality A produces the output level yE with a
cost frontier γ × TCE higher than the cost frontier coming from the frontier deﬁned by the
decentralized municipalities (γ × TCE) . Summing up, Figure 2 shows the scenario where
decentralization economies dominate; under these circumstances, the ratio between the cost
eﬃciency coeﬃcients (γ/β) will be higher than the unity.
However, nothing is granted in advance, as the opposite situation could also prevail. In
Figure 3 we can see how the point on the frontier obtained by duplicating municipality A
can produce yE with smaller total costs than the frontier deﬁned by the decentralized mu-
nicipalities (γ × TCE < β × TCE). In this speciﬁc case, Figure 3 represents an example
where centralized municipalities are operating with a better level of eﬃciency with respect to
the decentralized municipalities. In this circumstance, the ratio between the cost eﬃciency
coeﬃcients (γ/β) will be smaller than the unity.
2.1. Temporal analysis
The evaluation process represented in ﬁgures 1 through 3 has been developed in a previous ar-
ticle (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2009). We present now a natural extension introducing movements
over time of the frontiers corresponding to both centralized and decentralized municipalities.
Therefore, the question to answer is diﬀerent now, since the objective is to ascertain to what
extent diﬀerences in cost eﬃciency among centralized and decentralized municipalities are ex-
4Here we will only present the graphical illustration to oﬀer an intuitive idea about their proposal. Programs




9panded or contracted between two periods t and t+1. In other words, while in Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2009) a static picture is presented, we now focus on sequence of movements, which is
more complex as changes in time can be generated by a variety of causes.
Let us therefore assume that we have data corresponding to two time periods (t and t+1)
for the two sub-samples of municipalities (those operating in a centralized environment, S1,
and those others operating in a decentralized system, S2). It is feasible to deﬁne an index





whose value will be above (below) unity when decentralization economies increase (decrease)
between periods t and t + 1, respectively. If nothing changes, the index equals unity. The s2
superscript refers to municipalities aﬃliated to group S2 (decentralized).
This temporal index can be decomposed in a similar way to the Malmquist indices (see
Caves et al., 1982; Grosskopf, 2003). In doing so, we can determine the importance of technical
change (frontier shifts of between t and t+1), and eﬃciency change (considering the movements
in the distance separating the observation under analysis from their respective frontiers).
Allowing for this decomposition involves deﬁning two integer programming problems which




s.t. ˜ βs2,t+1TCs2,t+1 − TCs2,tλ ≥ 0,
−ys2,t+1 + Ms2,tλ ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
− →








s.t. ˜ γs2,t+1TCs2,t+1 − TCs1,tλ ≥ 0,
−ys2,t+1 + Ms1,tλ ≥ 0,
zB ≥ λ,
− →




where y, TC , β and γ have been already deﬁned and λ is an activity integer vector de-
noting the intensity levels at which the observation taken as benchmark is conducted; s1 is a
superscript indicating whether the evaluated municipality is aﬃliated to sub-sample S1 (cen-
tralized); M is a matrix containing the observed output vectors for the centralized (MS1) and
decentralized (MS2) municipalities; z is an activity integer vector having a value equal to one
when referring to the unit taken as a benchmark and having a null value otherwise; and B is
a scalar with a large absolute value.
Having obtained these new cost eﬃciency coeﬃcients, it is a straightforward process to














Eﬃciency change index (ec)
(4)
The technical change index (tc) quantiﬁes the observed movements on the frontier of
more decentralized municipalities with respect to the change in the frontier made up of less
decentralized ones. This index encompasses the relative shifts in best-practice technology,
corresponding to the two samples (S1 and S2) under analysis, between periods t and t + 1.
A technical change index larger than unity indicates that the best practice frontier of sub-
sample S2 improves more rapidly than that corresponding to sub-sample S1 (i.e., decentralized
municipalities go through faster technical progress). When the technical change index is below
unity, then the technical progress of the S1 sub-sample is higher than the technical progress
corresponding to the sub-sample S2 (i.e., less decentralized municipalities experience faster
technical progress).
One empirical example could shed light on the precise interpretation of this component.
If decentralization provides ﬂexibility, and ﬂexibility favors the capacity to innovate in order
11to do things better over time, then the technical change index is below unity when decentral-
ized municipalities demonstrate to have introduced innovations better than non decentralized
municipalities do.
In contrast, the eﬃciency change index (or catching up eﬀect, ec), shows what the changes
in the relative cost eﬃciency levels are, corresponding to the two samples—S1 and S2—under
analysis, between periods t and t+1. This index deﬁnes the distance of the observed costs for
periods t and t + 1 with respect to the frontier in period t. It indicates whether observations
in t + 1 are closer to the frontier than they are in period t. When the eﬃciency change
index is larger than unity, the cost eﬃciency change between periods t and t+1 shows greater
improvement for S2 (decentralized) sub-sample than for the S1 (less decentralized) sub-sample.
On the other hand, when the eﬃciency change index is below unity, the distance with respect
to the frontier of the sub-sample S1 (less decentralized) increases more than the distance with
respect to sub-sample S2 (decentralized).
Following the example of decentralization as a way to introduce ﬂexibility, the eﬃciency
change index is below unity when decentralized municipalities which take advantage of their
ﬂexibility are able to emulate the best performers faster than non ﬂexible municipalities. In
other words, non decentralized municipalities face a kind of barrier to mobility that limits
their capacity to adopt innovations.
As suggested by Worthington and Dollery (2000), this distinction is important from a
policy viewpoint, since the changes in productivity growth due to ineﬃciency demand diﬀerent
policies from those concerning technical change (see Grosskopf, 1993). As Worthington and
Dollery (2000) indicate sluggish productivity due to a poor eﬃciency change index would
require policies designed to spread innovations. In contrast, policies designed to innovate
would exert its impact on the technical change index.
2.2. Bipartite decomposition of the factors aﬀecting the decentralization economies
index
We now turn to an analysis of the distribution dynamics of the decentralization economies
index, which is generally more informative than summary statistics such as the conditional
mean of variance—as it is implicit in regression analysis (Quah, 1996a,b)—, especially when
multi-modality is present. Speciﬁcally, our objective is to assess the degree to which each of
the three components of productivity change account for deforming the distribution of the
decentralization index between 1995 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2005, in a similar fashion
12as Kumar and Russell (2002). We carry out the analysis by considering nonparametric kernel-
based density estimates, which are essentially smoothed histograms of our decentralization
indices.
Our decomposition of the factors which aﬀect the decentralization economies index is
presented in Equation (4). By rearranging terms, we obtain an expression which provides us
with information for period t + 1 level of decentralization economies:
(γs2/βs2)t+1 = tc × ec × (γs2/βs2)t (5)
where tc = (γs2,t+1/˜ γs2,t+1)/(βs2,t+1/˜ βs2,t+1) are the changes in decentralization economies
due to technological change (technical change index), ec = (˜ γs2,t+1/γs2,t)/(˜ βs2,t+1/βs2,t) rep-
resents the changes decentralization economies due to eﬃciency change (eﬃciency change
index), and (γs2/βs2)t represents the decentralization index in period t. Consequently, both
tc and ec impact on the advance of γs2/βs2. Both the eﬀect of tc and ec can be measured.
The distribution of the decentralization economies index in period t+1 can consequently
be constructed by successively multiplying the decentralization economies index in period t
by each of the two factors, i.e., technical change and eﬃciency change. This in turn allows us
to construct counterfactual distributions by sequential introduction of each of these factors.
Speciﬁcally, the counterfactual t + 1 period decentralization economies index distribution
of the variable
(γs2/βs2)TECH = tc × (γs2/βs2)t (6)
isolates the eﬀect on the distribution of changes in technology only, assuming that eﬃciency
change is irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (γs2/βs2)t to (γs2/βs2)t+1 would be induced by
changes in technology.
On the other hand, the counterfactual t + 1 period decentralization economies index dis-
tribution of the variable
(γs2/βs2)EFF = ec × (γs2/βs2)t (7)
then isolates the eﬀect on the distribution of γs2/βs2 of changes in eﬃciency only, as if technical
change were irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (γs2/βs2)t to (γs2/βs2)t+1 would be induced
by changes in eﬃciency only.
As indicated above, this analysis is performed considering density functions estimated
nonparametrically using kernel smoothing methods. The literature on this topic is voluminous,
and several monographs provide appropriate in-depth analysis. Perhaps the most popular one
13is Silverman (1986) although there are other important contributions such as Scott (1992) and
Wand and Jones (1995). The recent monograph by Li and Racine (2007) is a nice compendium
of previous studies, with new additional contributions.
The general kernel estimator is the Rosenblatt (1956)-Parzen (1962) kernel estimator,
whose expression is:











where ˆ f is the estimated density, x is the evaluation point, xs is the observation being evalu-
ated (s = 1,...,S) and h is the bandwidth, smoothing parameter or window width.
When estimating a density function via kernel smoothing methods, two critical decisions
must be made: (i) choosing the kernel; (ii) choosing the bandwidth. Both aﬀect the shape
of the density, but the eﬀect of the second decision is much larger compared with the ﬁrst
one and, consequently, the literature devoted to the selection of smoothing parameter is
vast. Regarding the choice of kernel, several alternatives are available. The features of a
kernel are those of a density function and, consequently, kernels are frequently chosen to
be well-known density functions (Pagan and Ullah, 1999), for example the standard normal
K(ψ) = (2π)−1/2exp(−.5ψ2), which was our choice. Regarding the bandwidth, the methods
that have become more widely used are the plug-in methods (Sheather and Jones, 1991),
because of their superior performance in terms of balance between bias and variance compared
with other methods. This was our choice. In addition, they are quite convenient because of
being now implemented in several statistical software packages such as R.5
We can also look at nonparametric techniques to formally test whether the distributions
obtained in previous sections diﬀer statistically. Speciﬁcally, we apply the Li (1996) test,
which analyzes whether two unknown distributions diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Therefore, if f and g
are the distributions corresponding to, let us say, γs2,t/βs2,t and γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1, the testable
null hypothesis would be H0 : γs2,t/βs2,t = γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1 against the alternative, H1 :
γs2,t/βs2,t  = γs2,t+1/βs2,t+1.6
The test we use is based on the generally accepted idea of measuring the global distance
(closeness) between two densities f(x) and g(x) by the integrated squared error (Pagan and
Ullah, 1999). The integrated square error is the basis for constructing the statistic on which
the test is based (see Fan, 1994; Li, 1996; Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The Li (1996) test
5Included in the package KernSmooth, based on Wand and Jones (1995).
6Some additional reﬁnements to this test have been recently proposed; see, for instance Li et al. (2009).
14requires some assumptions to be met such as independently distributed observations in each
sub-group, and identically within each sub-group. However, our estimates are dependent
in the statistical sense, since they have been obtained using linear programming methods.
Therefore, perturbations of observations which lie on the estimated frontier will generally
aﬀect the eﬃciencies estimated for other observations. Under these circumstances it is not
clear whether the Li (1996) test will perform satisfactorily. Accordingly, we follow Li (1999),
who shows that the bootstrap provides better inference than the standard normal. Simar
and Zelenyuk (2006) stress this point, indicating that in the speciﬁc setup of eﬃciency scores
obtained using linear programming techniques there is no real alternative than the bootstrap.
Therefore, we adopt Simar and Zelenyuk’s (2006) proposal based on the bootstrap for adapting
the Li (1996) test to the context of estimates obtained using linear programming methods.
Speciﬁcally, consistent bootstrap estimates of the p-values of the Li (1996) test in its own






I{ ˆ Jb > ˆ J}, (9)
where b = 1,...,B is the number of bootstrap replicates, I is an indicator function, ˆ J is the
statistic yielded by the Li (1996) test, and ˆ Jb is the bootstrapped statistic. These p-values
must be adapted to our context—where the true decentralization indices are replaced by our
estimates from equations (2) and (3).
3. Data, inputs, and outputs
We use a sample of 1,164 Spanish municipalities with a population over 1,000 inhabitants for
years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Although the total number of municipalities in the database was
higher, the ﬁnal number of observations is lower because we consider only those municipalities
with available information for the three sample years. Both input and output data are pro-
vided by the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration. The analysis is performed for years
1995, 2000 and 2005 only because the survey on local infrastructures and facilities (Encuesta
de Infraestructuras y Equipamientos Locales), which provides information on outputs, is only
available for those three periods. Input data has been constructed from local governments’
budgetary information. In this case the frequency is higher given that these data is available
for every year.
The selection of outputs is based on the services and facilities provided by each municipal-
15ity. Spanish local governments must provide minimum services depending on their number of
inhabitants. Some of them are universally provided, yet others are only a legal requirement
for larger municipalities. These categories are municipalities with: (i) less than 5,000 inhabi-
tants; (ii) of over 5,000 and less than 20,000; (iii) of more than 20,000 and less than 50,000;
(iv) and over 50,000. Our outputs have been selected according to the list of minimum ser-
vices.7 They include population (Y1), number of lighting points (Y2), tons of waste collected
(Y3), street infrastructure (Y4), public buildings (Y5), market (Y6), public parks (Y7), and
assistance centers (Y8). Outputs Y4 through Y8 are measured via their surface area, in square
meters. We thus measure eight services by means of the proxy indicators. Using proxies is
unavoidable since, as pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), population is clearly
not a direct output of local production but is assumed to proxy for the various administrative
tasks undertaken by municipalities. The choice has also been driven by previous studies on
eﬃciency in other European local governments for which diﬀerences are basically conﬁned to
the area of education—in Spain it is controlled by higher layers of government. An interesting
feature of our database is the inclusion of information on the quality of the infrastructures
and facilities. This is measured using an indicator taking the value of 1 (bad), 2 (fair) or 3
(good). We have constructed a weighted indicator of average quality, and it has been modeled
as an additional output (Y9).8
The inputs’ choice is based on budget information, which reﬂects municipalities’ costs.
Three main categories are included: current (ordinary) expenditures, capital expenditures,
and ﬁnancial expenditures. The ﬁrst ones contain four further categories, which account
for: (i) personnel expenditure; (ii) current goods and services expenditures; (iii) ﬁnancial
expenditures; (iv) current transfers. Capital expenditures are also decomposed, falling into
either real investments, or capital transfers. The former is what the economic budgetary
classiﬁcation labels as capital expenditures, i.e., all expenditures local governments implement
either: (i) to produce or acquire capital goods; (ii) to acquire necessary goods to provide local
services in the right conditions; (iii) ﬁnancial expenditures that are suitable for amortization.
Capital transfers refer to the payments to institutions to ﬁnance certain investments. Since
we measure overall cost eﬃciency, and all inputs refer to diﬀerent costs’ categories, they have
been added to sum up the total cost ﬁgure, TC.9 Some summary statistics for both inputs
7See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the minimum services that each category of
municipalities must provide, and the output indicators designed to measure (or to proxy) the diﬀerent services.
8The literature has considered multiple ways to control for the quality of the outputs. See, for instance,
the early proposals by Banker and Morey (1986).
9See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for additional details on the inputs and budgetary classiﬁcation.
16and outputs are reported in Table 1.
4. Results
The decentralization economies indicator should be interpreted as the gains that municipalities
achieve over time (between periods t and t + 1) from focusing on a wider range of services
and facilities. Summary results are reported in Table 2, and they suggest that, over time—
both from 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005—beneﬁts from a broader range have accrued
for municipalities with higher levels of powers, since most deciles of the decentralization
economies index distribution present values greater than unity. We provide information for
diﬀerent deciles of the distribution, since it permits realizing more accurately the magnitude of
the decentralization economies.10 Globally, these results evidence that, in relative terms, the
temporal evolution of the decentralized (or devolved) municipalities improves on the cost
frontier constructed with the less decentralized municipalities. The eﬀect is not entirely
mimicked for the 2000–2005, when the technical change eﬀect still prevails yet to a lesser
extent. However, the empirical evidence is not enough to conclude whether a clear tendency
exist. Recall that expression (4) breaks down the decentralization economies index into two
components: the technical change index (movements of the cost frontier) and the eﬃciency
change index (change in the distance separating ineﬃciency units from their cost frontier).
Table 2 is a good example of the advantages of breaking down global indices, in order to
disentangle the extent to which there are basic phenomena probably masked by excessively
aggregated indices. Indeed, the technical change index exhibits average values greater than
unity, which indicates that the decentralized best performing municipalities have shifted their
respective cost frontier more than the less decentralized best performers. On the other hand,
as the eﬃciency change index is signiﬁcantly smaller than unity, ineﬃcient decentralized mu-
nicipalities have been unable to follow the pace of the innovators. Therefore, the innovations
introduced by decentralized municipalities have a remarkable impact on eﬃciency, but the
spread of these innovations ﬁnds a sort of barriers to mobility, putting obstacles to the quick
dissemination of the innovations among the decentralized municipalities.
Overall, this reﬂects that the scope for improving the eﬃciency of decentralized munic-
ipalities through innovations introduced by the most dynamic decentralized municipalities
grew from 1995 to 2000, and to a lesser extent from 2000 to 2005. Regarding the ineﬃcient
units, once the barriers to mobility are overcome, they have a potential growth in eﬃciency
10For instance, a high average could be yielded simply because of the existence of outliers.
17and emulate the innovations introduced by the most dynamic decentralized municipalities. In
sum, innovations producing shifts in the cost frontiers are far more important in decentralized
municipalities. The shifts in the frontier, however, are not mechanically translated to the
decentralization index because there seems to be a problem in the spread of the innovations.
Once the problem of how to disseminate these good practices is solved, the advantage of the
decentralized municipalities in dynamic terms would be unquestionable.
We now turn to an analysis of distribution dynamics of the decentralization indices, and
focus not only on summary statistics like those reported in Table 1, but on how the entire
distributions have evolved. Figures 4 through 7 provide the means to assess to what extent
each of the two components of the decentralization economies index—technical change and
eﬃciency change—account for the deformation of its distribution between the selected sub-
periods and the entire 1995–2005 period. Figure 4.a displays kernel-based density estimates
(essentially “smoothed” histograms) of γs2/βs2 for years 1995 (t, solid line) and 2000 (t + 1,
dashed line). Figure 6.a reports analogous information for the 2000–2005 subperiod. Vertical
lines represent mean values for each distribution in each ﬁgure, i.e., solid line for the base
period, b, and dashed line for the current period, c. Both b and c diﬀer for the diﬀerent
ﬁgures. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we have that b = 1995 and c = 2000, whereas in Figure
6 and Figure 7, b = 2000 and c = 2005. These vertical lines suggest that the advances have
been modest and, therefore, we can probably conclude that decentralization economies have
not improved over time on average. A more extended graphical analysis considering the entire
distribution and not only a summary statistic reveals that diﬀerences between both distrib-
utions are not very important, and therefore we can probably conclude that decentralization
economies have not improved over time. This conclusion applies for the 2000–2005 transi-
tion (Figure 6.a and Figure 7.a). However, for the 1995–2000 period (Figure 4.a and Figure
5.a) diﬀerences between both densities are peculiar, as we could conclude they are conﬁned
to being slightly tighter in year 2000. The bandwidths for the diﬀerent densities (obtained
using the second-generation plug-in method by Sheather and Jones (1991)) are reported in
the diﬀerent legends. Not all the legends have bandwidths, since some of the ﬁgures are the
same.11
However, decomposing the evolution of γs2/βs2 into its two components (technical change
and eﬃciency change) suggests the shift from γs2,1995/βs2,1995 to γs2,2000/βs2,2000 has been
generated by two opposite eﬀects. Figure 4.b indicates that the factor contributing positively
11Figures and bandwidths obtained by alternative methods are available upon request. Results only diﬀered
slightly.
18to its advance has been technical change component. The solid line represents the distrib-
ution in Equation (6), which isolates the eﬀect on the distribution of changes in technology
only, as if no eﬃciency change occurred from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, the ﬁnal (year 2000)
distribution would be represented by the solid line. Vertical lines indicate the mean values for
both distributions (γs2,1995/βs2,1995 and (γs2/βs2)TECH = tc×(γs2/βs2)1995, respectively) do
indeed diﬀer substantially, as already reported in Table 1. What Table 1 does not indicate is
that, although the technical change index has increased to a large extent, dispersion has also
increased remarkably, as reﬂected by much more spread probability mass for (γs2/βs2)TECH
as compared with γs2,1995/βs2,1995. Finally, Figure 4.c displays the distribution of γs2/βs2 for
year 2000 alone, i.e., transition from Figure 4.b to Figure 4.c reveals the eﬀect of eﬃciency
change only. The patterns are very similar when evaluating the transitions from 2000 to 2005
(Figure 6.b), except for the existence of certain bimodality from 1995 to 2000 (Figure 4.b).
Therefore, the general trend—indicating that dispersion is much higher regarding technical
change—is corroborated. It is also important to realize the importance of evaluating these
trends not only via the usual summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) but rather
examining the shape of the densities. Their analysis is important because of their peculiarities,
showing that the eﬀect of technical change leads to its ﬂattening, especially in the vicinity of
the average.
Figure 5 and Figure 7 report similar information to that reported in Figure 4 and Figure
6, respectively. The main diﬀerence is contained in Figure 5.b and Figure 7.b, where the solid
lines indicate what the impact is on γs2/βs2 of eﬃciency change only, i.e., we isolate the eﬀect
on the distribution of γs2/βs2 as if no technical change existed. As indicated by both the
mean (solid vertical line) and the deformation of the distribution, it is clearly detrimental, for
both 1995–2000 (Figure 5.b) and 2000–2005 (Figure 7.b) periods. The decline in the mean
value is lower than the mean increase reported in Figure 4.b and Figure 6.b, and insinuates
that a positive eﬀect over time could prevail. However, as shown by Figure 4.a and 5.a, the
shapes of the distributions do not seem to diﬀer a great deal.
The conclusions inferred from visually analyzing distributions can be reinforced via appli-
cation of the tests proposed in Section 2 (Li, 1996, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006). These
are reported in Table 3, which corroborate results in ﬁgures 4 through 7. The p-values ob-
tained when testing the null H0 : f[(γs2/βs2)b] = g[(γs2/βs2)c] indicates that the visual
diﬀerences found between distributions in the base (b) and current (c) periods are signiﬁcant
in all instances. Therefore, the eﬀects of technical change and eﬃciency change considered
19individually lead to signiﬁcant changes in the shape of the densities, since both of them are
statistically signiﬁcant at the most stringent signiﬁcance levels and for all comparisons (either
1995 vs. 2000, or 2000 vs. 2005).
5. Concluding remarks
In this article we analyze the links between devolution and eﬃciency of Spanish municipalities
from a dynamic perspective, considering the evolution for two periods, namely, from 1995
to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005. These are relevant years in which the Spanish economy
surged, and when some relevant initiatives for Spanish local governments took place. We
construct a methodology based on the (deterministic) frontier production function literature
(Farrell, 1957; Afriat, 1972; Färe et al., 1994). Speciﬁcally, we derived an indicator à la
Malmquist (Caves et al., 1982) which allows us to measure whether eﬃciency gains from
enhanced decentralization of powers have increased over time. The indicator also decomposes
this time evolution in two components with speciﬁc economic meanings, in a similar fashion
to the Malmquist index which decomposes productivity change into eﬃciency change and
technical change.
We also consider a sequential decomposition of the decentralization economies indicator in
the spirit of Kumar and Russell (2002). This decomposition allows us to ascertain what the
most important component of the decentralization economies indicator is—either the technical
change or the catching up component. We consider that this methodology is important since
results might vary a great deal across local governments, and applying this approach generates
results which are not based on central moments of the distribution only. In particular, results
show that the eﬀect of technical change varies a great deal across municipalities, whereas
catching up is more homogeneous.
The application to Spanish local governments is relevant for several reasons, among which
we may highlight the debate on the hypothetical beneﬁts attainable from a second decentral-
ization (that consists of transferring powers not only from national to regional but also from
regional to the lowest layer of government, i.e., municipalities), and the response of munic-
ipalities to the new regulatory environment emerging after passing the law on the balanced
budget, which is related to the European Stability and Growth Pact. Some recent trends
in the economy such as the crisis of the construction sector make it even more relevant to
analyze the Spanish case, where powers related to urbanism are in hands of municipalities.
Results show that, over time, beneﬁts for larger municipalities (with more powers) are
20increasing, due to the relatively higher magnitude of the technical change compared to the
eﬃciency change index. However, diﬀerences are remarkable across municipalities—some of
them perform very well, others trail behind. Decentralization economies, which are the result
of the combined eﬀect of technical change and eﬃciency change, have not improved on aver-
age, and this result is robust to the period under analysis—either 1995–2000 or 2000–2005.
In contrast, eﬃciency change is lower, but diﬀerences among municipalities are less stringent,
contributing positively to reduce discrepancies among municipalities in the decentralization
index. These ﬁndings could be related to the trend experienced in most public sector areas
before Spain’s economy joined the Euro, which followed the stipulations of the Maastricht
Treaty on the sustainability of the government ﬁnancial position. The commitments of Maas-
tricht brought about a policy of control of deﬁcit, boosting the demand for more eﬃcient
government and public administration, and a “White paper on the improvement of public
services. A new administration at the service of citizens” was released in 1999. These were
initiatives to reform public administration, introducing many of the speciﬁc changes in man-
agement practice, included in the New Public Management (NPM) (Pollitt, 2002) recipe, but
without being able to set oﬀ systemic changes. Thus, although Spain has implemented many
of the ingredients of the NPM, there are still few visible beneﬁts. Our ﬁndings, indicating
that remarkable diﬀerences exist among municipalities, corroborate these claims. They also
conﬁrm that trends diﬀer for the two sample periods considered, although only slightly.




a,b (TC) 669.999 441.280
Outputs
Population (Y1) 3,290.500 8,935.361
Number of lighting points
b (Y2) 0.233 1.355
Tones of waste collected
c (Y3) 0.467 34.985
Street infrastructure surface area
b,c (Y4) 51.966 41.255
Public buildings surface area
b,c (Y5) 0.028 1.784
Market surface area
b,c (Y6) 0.002 3.077
Registered area of public parks
b,c (Y7) 3.373 204.229
Assistance centers surface area
b,c (Y8) 0.170 0.766
Quality (Y9) 2.283 0.315
# of observations 1,164
a In thousands of 1995 pesetas (1 euro=166.386 pesetas).
b Divided by population.
c In square metres.
28Table 2: Percentage change of bipartite decomposition indexes, selected deciles
Index 10% decile 30% decile 50% decile 70% decile 90% decile
(median)
1995–2000
Change in decentralization economies 52.05 76.92 96.03 124.10 228.77
Technical change 77.71 107.08 142.20 186.23 311.24
Eﬃciency change 29.73 52.78 70.11 93.01 153.80
2000–2005
Change in decentralization economies 34.49 71.59 89.51 113.07 162.87
Technical change 48.65 86.07 112.98 153.77 270.30
Eﬃciency change 39.25 60.95 80.76 100 128.18
2
9Table 3: Distribution hypothesis tests, 1995 vs. 2000 vs. 2005 (Li, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006)
































































EFF] 14.700 0.000 H0 rejected
Notes: The functions f(·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for the actual decentralization economies
index in the current and base period, respectively; g
TECH(·) and g
EFF(·) are counterfactual distributions obtained
by adjusting the 1995 distribution of (γ
s2/β
s2) for the eﬀects of advances in technology (tc) and advances in
eﬃciency (ec), respectively.
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